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Abstract
This paper presents a theoretical framework analysing the signalling channel of ex-
change rate interventions as an informational trigger. We develop an implicit target
zone framework with learning in order to model the signalling channel. The theo-
retical premise of the model is that interventions convey signals that communicate
information about the exchange rate objectives of the central bank. The model is
used to analyse the impact of Japanese FX interventions during the period 1999
-2011 on the yen/US dollar dynamics.
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1 Introduction
Since the introduction of a flexible exchange rate regime in the spring 1973, the Japanese
yen has experienced large fluctuations, with the yen on a rising trajectory. In order to
mitigate the impact of such fluctuations on the Japanese economy and in order to help
push economic growth into positive territory, foreign exchange market interventions with
the aim of influencing exchange rates have been conducted from time to time. These
interventions are executed by the Bank of Japan on behalf of the Japanese Minister of
Finance.1
Between April 1991 and 2010, the Bank of Japan intervened on 350 days against the
US dollar, often on a massive scale and in a unilateral manner. More than 90 percent
of the transactions involved purchases of US dollar, as the Bank of Japan attempted
to slow down the appreciation of the bilateral yen/US dollar ("JPY/USD" hereinafter)
exchange rate.
After the deadly earthquake in the city of Kobe on 17 January 1995 the JPY/USD
exchange rate experienced a remarkable surge. Initially, the Japanese currency weakened
to 100.23 JPY/USD before appreciating to a 79.75 JPY/USD in April 1996. This
triggered a series of interventions by the Bank of Japan at that time.
In the opposite direction, an unprecedented level of yen purchasing took place on 10 April
1998 leading to a rebound of the exchange rate. On the 18th of June, 1998 a time-shifted
parallel US intervention occurred. Subsequently, the yen began to appreciate against the
US dollar intermittently. That finally led the Bank of Japan to intervene in the foreign
exchange markets. From January 2000 to December 2004 the Bank of Japan intervened
on 148 different days and sold more than 44 trillion yen, in the hope of propping up the
US dollar and reversing the "unwelcome" and "disorderly" yen appreciation. However,
a precise target zone band was never established.2
1Since the Bank of Japan is acting as an agent, the term "Bank of Japan intervention" is only
superficially correct. In July 2001 the Japanese Ministry of Finance started to release daily intervention
amounts and the direction of the intervention going back to 1991. Since then the Japanese Ministry of
Finance reports the track record of its interventions (dates, currencies involved and amounts) 30 days
after the end of each financial quarter. See http://www.mof.go.jp/english/international_policy/
reference/feio/index.htm.
2The underlying problem is that the Bank of Japan has never released a categorical breakdown of
when, why and how they intervene. Nor have they ever published any definition of "disorderliness". Ito
and Yabu (2007) and Hall and Kim (2009) have tried to determine empirically the Japanese "leaning
against the wind" intervention philosophy. They have found that interventions were more likely after
large exchange rate movements on the previous day, and that deviations from a long-term moving
average have also led to decisions to intervene. On the other hand, Japan’s government repeatedly
1
After April 2004, Japan experienced a record duration without an exchange rate in-
tervention. However, on 15 September 2010 Japan made its first foreign yen selling
exchange rate intervention in six years and spent the equivalent of 2.1249 trillion yen on
currency intervention. This represented an attempt to stem the yen’s strength, which
had been pushed to its highest rate against the US dollar since 1995. By doing this,
the Bank of Japan demonstrated that they were willing to intervene to prevent the US
dollar from moving below 83 JPY/USD. The intervention topped the previous record of
1.666 trillion yen for Japanese yen-selling intervention on a single day, set on 9 January
2004. The intervention was triggered by speculation that the Federal Reserve would im-
plement further quantitative easing measures in order to shore up the US economy. This
speculation had driven the yen higher, which had raised concerns in Japan that it could
derail the fragile Japanese economic recovery and aggravate the long-standing liquidity
trap.3 Another explanation behind the yen’s strength was that increasing Chinese pur-
chase of Japanese government bonds and other yen denominated assets had contributed
to the yen’s appreciation. Taking all these things together, the yen headed towards the
upper 80 JPY/USD level against the US dollar and the intervention reversed the yen’s
appreciation trend only briefly.
On 11 March 2011, a destructive earthquake and tsunami hit North East Japan and killed
thousands of people and left tens of thousands injured and homeless. The nuclear crisis
brought on by the natural disaster made the situation even worse. After the disastrous
earthquake, a sudden surge in the value of the yen to a new post-war high against the
US dollar occurred at 76.25 JPY/USD. The expected large-scale repatriation of foreign
assets to pay for earthquake reconstruction may have been a factor. In this instance,
history appears to have repeated itself: In the aftermath of the Kobe earthquake in
1995, the yen temporarily surged by almost 20 per cent against the US dollar. In any
case, a further rise in the yen would be at odds with the needs of an economy still mired
in a deflationary trap, and add to the economic pain of rebuilding the country after
the contractionary shock from the earthquake and the nuclear disaster. In response to
the yen surge, the G7 countries carried out a large scale coordinated intervention on 18
announced that intervention was aimed exclusively at curbing excessive foreign exchange movements,
not meant to weaken the yen to gain a competitive advantage.
3The Bank of Japan appeared to have bought US dollars after the JPY/USD exchange rate had
declined to certain (time-varying) levels. On the other hand, Japan’s government repeatedly announced
that intervention was aimed exclusively at curbing excessive foreign exchange movements, and not meant
to weaken the yen to gain a competitive advantage.
2
March. A large proportion of the intervention funds were spent by the Bank of Japan.
The coordinated G7 action sent the yen tumbling to 81.11 JPY/USD. Lastly, in August
2011, the Japanese government took further action to tackle the strong yen without
intervening directly in the FX market. The government set up a fund of 100 billion US
dollars available for Japanese acquisitions abroad in a bid to encourage capital outflows.
The action, however, did little to stop the yen from rising.4
The article proceeds as follows. In the next section, we revisit the impact of central bank
interventions in a theoretical modelling framework. Section 3 outlines the calibration
methodology and discusses the results from the numerical exercise. Finally, Section 4
concludes our study.
2 Modelling Framework
In this section, we propose a theory of exchange rate interventions that is consistent
with the salient descriptive empirical facts documented in the introduction.5 As empha-
sised in the thorough literature survey by Sarno and Taylor (2001), interventions may
have an impact via various transmission channels. In their appraisal of the academic
literature they attach particular importance to the signalling (or expectations) chan-
nel and the means by which it works. The signalling channel indicates that, through
transparent exchange rate interventions, the Bank of Japan conveys inside information
to market participants and hence alters their expectations about the future dynamics
of the nominal JPY/USD exchange rate.6 Interventions may also indicate the Bank of
4However, the Bank of Japan was unwilling to commit itself to a preset "minimum" exchange rate
as Switzerland did on 6 September 2011. The Swiss National Bank (SNB) announced it would buy
"unlimited quantities" of foreign currency in exchange for Swiss francs (SFr) to defend the ceiling of
SFr 1.20 per euro. Ultimately, the SNB is using quantitative easing with the aim of driving down its
exchange rate to the preset ceiling. The SFr has become a haven for investors fleeing the euro zone’s debt
crisis. The SNB decided to take this step after having attempted to drive down the SFr by intervening
in the FX markets, to little lasting effect.
5It should be noted that our presentation of the model leaves aside the normative discussion on the
desirability of influencing the exchange rate, as well as its merits relative to other policy instruments.
While the focus of our paper is on Japan, our model can also cast light on the experience of other
emerging market countries. For example, attracted by high growth rates and exceptionally low interest
rates in rich countries, capital flows into Latin America have surged once more in 2010. Many Latin
American countries have tried to prevent their currencies from rising in nominal terms and governments
have launched a battery of measures in an attempt to restrain the appreciation of their currencies.
6In our model the exchange rate dynamics is responsive to actual exchange rate interventions. Domin-
quez and Panthaki (2007) have provided some empirical evidence that even rumours about interventions
may cause exchange rates to move.
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Japan’s commitment to a specific value of the JPY/USD exchange rate.7 The infor-
mational gain arises because central banks have at least inside information about their
own future actions and policies that other market participants do not have. Central
bank interventions are therefore "big news" on the market and convey a signal to mar-
ket participants about future fundamentals. The novelty of our approach is to combine
this signalling channel with recent advances of the exchange rate literature in modelling
implicit exchange rate targets.8
Despite the important insights that have emerged from existing empirical research on the
impact of foreign exchange interventions, the theoretical literature on the link between
interventions and exchange rate dynamics is still in its infancy. More often than not,
empirical research is running ahead of the theory.9 In contrast to the existing empirical
literature, this paper therefore intends to investigate the interventions - exchange rate
dynamics nexus within a theoretical modelling framework. Even if much remains to
be explored and refined, the presented modelling framework makes an important con-
tribution towards understanding the underlying complex issues. At the same time the
modelling exercise points the way to new questions and new ideas for further research.
Thereby, we begin with the Krugman (1991) target zone model typifying many inter-
mediate regimes, and extend the model incorporating ideas by Klein (1992) and Chen
et al. (2013). A particular characteristic of the JPY/USD exchange rate is the long-term
appreciation. This crawling of the exchange rate over time and the standard target zone
modelling approach with horizontal bands mutually exclude one another. Therefore,
unlike Krugman’s original approach, we detrend the exchange rate in order to obtain
an implicit horizontal band that allows the application of the target zone modelling ap-
proach. For the simulations in section 3, the detrended exchange rate is then reverse
engineered. This methodological fix allows one to determine how the signalling channel
7 Baillie et al. (2000) have surveyed the role of interventions in terms of their effects on the flow
of information and the formation of expectations. Reeves (1998) has analysed the working of the
signalling channel in a theoretical model which allows for nonrational expectations and partial credibility.
Bhattacharya and Weller (1997) have constructed a theoretical, asymmetric information model of the
FX market that explicitly incorporates interventions. In their model, the central bank makes accurate
inferences about the private agents’ information, and agents get better but incomplete information from
observing the interventions of the central bank.
8Given the presence of a signalling channel, it is a puzzle why some central banks maintain secrecy
of their intervention operations. One possible explanation for this behaviour is given in Bhattacharya
and Weller (1997). According to their model, interventions under asymmetric information may lead
to perverse responses and therefore the model provides a rationale for hiding interventions. But this
constitutes a special case which is ill-suited to explain the frequent incidence of secret interventions.
9See Menkhoff (2010) for the discussions of empirical research.
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has altered the dynamics of the exchange rate at various points of time.
2.1 Basic Model
Exchange rate dynamics in a target zone are typically modelled as in the seminal paper
by Krugman (1991).10 The standard target zone model assumes a fully credible preset
exchange rate bands supported by infinitesimal interventions at the margins. Krugman
highlights the stabilising effect of such a target zone on the exchange rate, due to mar-
ket expectations of interventions if the exchange rate hits the bands. These market
expectations generate a nonlinear S-shaped relationship between the exchange rate and
economic fundamentals.
The following equations are expressed in continuous time and solved by applying stochas-
tic calculus. Displaying the idea that the forward-looking nature of rational expectations
exerts an influence on the dynamics of the exchange rate, the model starts with the log-
linear asset pricing equation that expresses the logarithm of the nominal exchange rate,
ln(S(t)) =: s(t), as the sum of the logarithm of the fundamental, ln(F (t)) =: f(t), and
the expected rate of change in the exchange rate:
s(t) = f(t) + τ
E(ds(t))
dt
,(1)
where E[·] denotes the rational expectations operator and τ ≥ 0 captures the sensitiv-
ity to the expectations. For a pure free float arrangement the nominal exchange rate
moves according to the developments of the fundamentals, meaning s(t) = f(t) which
is displayed by a 45 degree line when plotting the fundamentals against the exchange
rate. On the contrary, for a credible target zone arrangement the exchange rate curve
is non-linear where its upper and lower part is bounded by the bands. If the exchange
rate approaches either of the boundaries, the public’s expectations of appreciation or
depreciation cannot be zero any longer, since the central bank is believed to prevent
the exchange rate from transgressing the band. Expressed in technical terms, the ex-
pectation operator E(ds(t))dt in equation (1) assumes a negative value in the upper part
of the zone and positive one in the lower part. Ruling out arbitrage opportunities, the
exchange rate is supposed to approach the boundaries smoothly until it touches them
10Froot and Obstfeld (1991) refine the target zone setup and present a rigorous proof of the Krugman
(1991) model, showing how the solutions change with different policy scenarios at the boundaries.
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tangentially. Due to the increasing probability of an intervention and as the exchange
rate depends also on its expected future development, the exchange rate is drawn more
closely to the centre of the target zone than a free floating exchange rate.11 Hence, the
influence of the expectations makes the exchange rate curve evolve in an S-shaped pat-
tern. However, it must be noted that equation (1) and the above described features are
based on the assumption of a steady state, where the target zone is framed by fixed hor-
izontals. Time-dependently moving bands exclude an analytically derived closed-form
solution for the exchange rate dynamics.12 In the case of Japan, where the prevailing
relatively low inflation rate has been forcing the exchange rate to appreciate for many
years, the assumption of a constant strong-side band would be far-fetched. To make
Krugman’s model applicable we detrend the nominal Japanese exchange rate and then
consider the dynamics of its logarithm:
s(t) = f(t) + τ
E(ds(t))
dt
(2)
where s denotes the detrended exchange rate. Which detrending technique to apply
without introducing a source of bias is discussed in section 3. For now, we leave this
question aside and choose a symbolical notation for the relationship between the nominal
exchange rate and its detrended version by s(t) = s(t)ζ(t) . Being a detrended value the
fundamental f is driven by fluctuations that lack any drift term but evolve according to
df = σdz.(3)
This equation states that infinitesimal changes in f are given by changes in the Brownian
motion dz that are scaled with its own standard deviation σ.13 To handle this process,
we introduce a function g with g(f) := s. Given the process for the fundamental as
11The empirical relevance of this effect - referred to as the honeymoon effect - is examined for an
estimated target zone model for the ERM system by Iannizzotto and Taylor (1999). They find that
although the target zone arrangement is assumed as fully credible, the honeymoon effect could be of a
small magnitude only. In fact, aside from the dynamics close to the boundaries, their estimates disclose
no significant deviation from the linear relationship between the fundamentals and a free float.
12An upward moving real exchange rate band is examined by Weller (1992), where interventions
occur as soon as the price level excesses certain thresholds. Due to the non-availability of an analytical
solution the model is discussed qualitatively by considering it transferred to a constant nominal band.
13Alternatively, the exchange rate in a target zone may be modelled by a mean-reverting diffusion
process, as for example applied by Larsen and Sørensen (2007) to investigate asymmetry between the
currencies. This approach, however, forecloses the explicit consideration of the intervention policy and
the resulting effects on the speculators’ expectations.
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described in equation (2), applying Itô’s lemma yields the following differential equation:
E(ds)
dt
=
σ2
2
g′′.(4)
Equation (4) implies that the logarithm of the detrended exchange rate is subject to the
second-order differential equation
s = f + τ
σ2
2
g′′.(5)
The innovation is that we solve the second-order ordinary differential equation (5) for
the special case of a free-float on the weak side and an implicit target on the strong
side.14 This provides a sound modelling framework with considerable rigour to facilitate
an understanding of yen dynamics. In particular, we seek to answer two questions. First,
how do exchange rate interventions orientate expectations towards future exchange rate
dynamics? Second, how sensitive is the dynamics of the exchange rate to prior beliefs?
To answer these questions, we extend the implicit band model to include learning about
the intervention triggers.15
2.2 The Strong-Side Band
To solve equation (5) we incorporate information about the Japanese exchange rate
system. Officially, the JPY/USD exchange rate is operated as a free-float. Indeed, the
central bank has not been forced to intervene on the weak side for more than 12 years.16
However, the yen also faces constant appreciation pressure and a certain appreciation
trend is expected by the public and accepted by the Bank of Japan. Intensified pressure
on the strong side has prompted interventions to avoid negative exchange rate impacts
that would be particularly harmful to foreign trade. An overly strong yen could hurt
Japan’s economy, as it is an economy that depends heavily on foreign trade. This
observation justifies the assumption of a free-float on the weak side and an implicit
strong-side band for solving equation (5).
Denote the intervention triggering fundamental on the strong side by Fl. Then by apply-
14Frenkel and Goldstein (1987) have labelled a target zone regime allowing for domestic policy dis-
cretion without precommitting defending the exchange rate at any price a "quiet target zone".
15This focus on informational issues is in contrast to the view that interventions work via changing
demand and supply condition of the FX market.
16More precisely, the last intervention against depreciation pressure was operated on the 17th of July
1998.
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ing the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions and substituting the fundamental
value, we obtain
s(t) = f(t) +A(Fl) exp(−rf(t)),(6)
where
r =
√
2
τσ2
,(7)
and
A(Fl) =
1
r
exp(rFl).(8)
Equation (6) would define the exchange rate dynamics fully, if the central bank an-
nounced the exact value of Fl. It should be noted that 1r captures the difference be-
tween s and f at the announced and fully credible strong side band. The stronger the
uncertainty σ, and the higher the sensitivity to expectations, the bigger is the devi-
ation of the exchange rate to the fundamentals along the 45 degree line due to more
frequent/stronger interventions.
In the next section we describe how intervention policies via the disclosure of information
serve as a focal point for market participants in an asymmetric "quiet target zone".
2.3 The Outset
This section provides an outline of the initial situation. Market participants’ expecta-
tions are assumed to depend on their perception of the present central bank behaviour
and not on past interventions. A possible justification of this assumption is that the
public has observed a very long period without any intervention, or that economic and
politic circumstances have changed in a way that past experiences and observations do
not provide any anchoring for their expectations.
In this situation, the idea of how to include the expectation formation by market partic-
ipants into the model is based on Klein (1992). In this paper the nominal exchange rate
that triggers intervention against appreciation pressure is expected to be somewhere in
the horizontal interval [ln(S1), ln(S2)]. Specified for the nominal JPY/USD exchange
rate the intervention zone slopes downward over time. Enclosing all possible values for
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the implicit strong-side band, this zone is thus to be detrended in the same manner as
equation (1). From now on let the intervals [S1,S2] and the corresponding fundamen-
tals [F1,F2] always refer to the normalised values forming the intervention zone in the
detrended exchange rate model.
It is obvious that the coefficient A of equation (6) is a function of the lower band and
hence the corresponding fundamentals related to the lower band. As market partic-
ipants can only form expectations of possible interventions on lower bands and their
corresponding fundamentals, the expected value of coefficient A can be obtained by the
following expectation operator
E
(
A
(
F
l
))
≡E
(
A
(
F
l
) ∣∣∣interventions, fundamentals of interventions)
=E
(
A
(
F
l
) ∣∣∣ fundamentals of interventions) ,(9)
as the fundamentals related to the possible lower bands are a function of possible inter-
ventions. Whenever the central bank intervenes, market participants can compute the
corresponding fundamentals of interventions. Market participants form their expecta-
tions based on past interventions if available. This implies that market participants need
to form a priori distribution of possible interventions and their corresponding fundamen-
tals, and then compute the expected values of the coefficient A. If past observations of
interventions are not available, we assume a uniform distribution of interventions and
hence a uniform distribution of the corresponding fundamentals is used, which is dis-
cussed in this section. After the first intervention, market participants would then form
a new distribution of interventions and fundamentals, as described in section 2.4.
As past interventions are excluded from market participants’ expectations and thus no a
priori information about the next intervention is incorporated, it is reasonable to postu-
late that people act on the assumption of a uniform distribution of possible (unknown)
trigger values of fundamentals in the range [F1,F2]. In other words, any fundamental
in the range [F1,F2] has an equal chance of being the trigger for an intervention.17
Consider the situation at the outset in t0, where the exchange rate has not appreciated
beyond S2, yet, and the intervention zone is framed by S1 and S2. To obtain the
closed form solution for equation (5) that takes the market participants’ expectations
into account, Klein (1992) proposes to make use of a no-arbitrage condition. Thus the
17The uniform distribution assumption also economises on the model’s complexity.
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actual exchange rate value must equal the expected one, i.e. s(t0) = E(s(t0)). Using
E(s(t0)) requires the computation of the expected value of A that evolves as
E(A) =E
(
A
(
F
l
) ∣∣∣F1,F2)
=
∞∫
−∞
1
r
exp(rv) dφ(v)
=
F2∫
F1
exp(rv)
r (F2 −F1) dv
=
exp(rF2)− exp(rF1)
r2(F2 −F1) ,(10)
where we use the uniform distribution with density
φ(v) =
1
F1 −F2 1{v∈[F1,F2]},(11)
to weigh the parameter A in (8). Now applying the no-arbitrage condition by calculating
E(s(t0)) and then equalising it with s(t0), the value of the exchange rate at the outset
in t0 is derived:
s(t0) = f(t0) +
exp(rF2)− exp(rF1)
r2(F2 −F1) exp(−rf(t0)).(12)
Assume now that in t = t∗, t∗ > t0, the exchange rate appreciates beyond S2 by taking
a value S∗, S1 ≤ S∗ < S2, and the Bank of Japan does not respond by intervening. This
is observed by the market participants and serves as information about the exchange
rate values that are tolerable to the monetary authorities. More precisely, interventions
in [S∗,S2] are not expected anymore. In the expectations, the upper boundary S2 of
the intervention zone is then updated to S∗, which is tantamount to a contraction of the
support of the uniform distribution
φ(v) =
1
F1 −F∗ 1{v∈[F1,F∗]},(13)
where the fundamental value F∗ corresponds to S∗. Therefore the intervention zone
narrows and every exchange rate in this new zone becomes a more likely candidate to
be the intervention triggering one. Taking the density (13) to calculate E(A), we obtain
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the new closed form solution for the exchange rate for time t > t∗
s(t) = f(t) +
exp(rF∗)− exp(rF1)
r2(F∗ −F1) exp(−rf(t)).(14)
In the limit case, where the exchange rate appreciates so far that F∗ approaches F1,
equation (14) evolves as18
s(t) −→ f(t) + exp(rF1)
r
exp(−rf(t)) for F∗ ↘ F1.(15)
For f → F1, L’Hospital’s Rule provides the lowest point of the curve being
S1 = F1 +
1
r
.(16)
It should be noted, that the second summand in equation (14) grows with declining F∗
until it reaches the limit 1r . The economic interpretation of the term
1
r is straightforward.
The wedge 1r represents the deviation from the 45 degree line and thus captures the
difference between S1 and F1 at the implicit strong-side band. Comparing equation (15)
with equation (8), it is obvious that the exchange rate dynamics match, in the limit,
those of a fully credible target zone at the lower edge. Another intuitive explanation is
that this is like the honeymoon effect in the fully credible target zone model, but here
it is driven by expectations of future interventions aimed at discouraging the JPY/USD
exchange rate from appreciating too much.
As a thumbnail sketch, Figure 1 illustrates the modelling framework. It describes the
intervention zone [S1,S2] and the corresponding interval [F1,F2] of the fundamentals
by the dashed lines. The 45 degree line depicts the dynamics of the free-float, s = f.
At the outset, where the exchange rate has not moved beyond S2, the actual curve is
outlined by the segment ab. Resembling the curve progression in a fully credible target
zone model, it pastes smoothly to S2 at the lower edge. At the upper edge, however, it
takes the shape of the free-float. When appreciating over time, the curve lowers until it
pastes smoothly to the lower boundary of the intervention zone, S1. We can even tell
18Lowering only the upper boundary of the intervention zone, while leaving the lower boundary
unchanged, may raise the question, whether the market participants would not rather update their
expectations by shifting the whole intervention zone downwards. This approach assigns to every ex-
change rate the same probability to be the intervention triggering one regardless of the exchange rate
movements. However, by following Klein (1992) we emphasise that the market participants think an
intervention more likely the more the currency appreciates.
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the exact locations of the minima. Equation (14) reveals that this point of the curve
and the 45 degree line are kept separate by the second term in the sum. This distance
is thus growing with declining F∗ until it amounts 1r for the limit case represented by
curve bc. Put differently, the more the exchange rate appreciates the more it deviates
from the free-float and the more expectations matter. Hence, all possible exchange rate
curves that may evolve over time are located in the sickle-shaped red area, abc.
F1 F2
2 a
b
c
f
f=
S
1S
S
S
1r
Figure 1: Relationship between Fundamentals and Exchange Rate with a Continuum of
Possible Intervention Triggering Exchange Rates on the Strong Side
The framework described above works on the assumption that the non-occurrence of an
intervention signals the unknown edge of the strong-side band. It reveals the central
bank’s true preferences and alters market participants’ expectations. In addition, the
more the exchange rate appreciates, the higher the expected intervention probability, as
the intervention zone narrows. In the next subsection, we offer a sophisticated modelling
framework that describes the exchange rate in the aftermath of the first intervention.
2.4 The Exchange Rate after the First Intervention
As time passes, an intervention takes place at t = T1. Numerous survey studies confirm
that speculators in foreign exchange rate markets prefer to pursue simple backward-
looking trading rules than strategies derived from mathematically well-defined econo-
metric and economic models, see Cheung and Chinn (2001) and Menkhoff (1998). Thus
it is reasonable to assume that the market participants make use of the information of
12
ST1 , which is tantamount to replacing the uniform distribution of possible intervention
triggering fundamentals with a density function that puts more weight on the corre-
sponding fundamental value FT1 .
The post-intervention model also needs to account for the success of the intervention in
ST1 . An effective operation leads to exchange rate values that are larger than ST1 . In
this case, the exchange rate ST1 may serve as the new strong-side band in the public’s
expectations. On the contrary, if the fundamentals make the exchange rate appreciate
further regardless of the central bank’s efforts, ST1 is not regarded as an anchor to
forecast exchange rate movements.
A model that meets these considerations has been developed by Chen et al. (2013).
The approach, which is applied to the nominal HKD/US dollar exchange rate, can be
transferred to this detrended exchange rate model. Hence, we postulate that the market
participants’ expectations of the intervention triggering exchange rate in t = T2 are
assumed to be conditioned on the actual detrended exchange rate value being located
above ST1 or beneath, that is in the intervention zone [S1,ST1 ].
Starting with the assumption that the last intervention in T1 has been without suc-
cess, we consider the conditional probability functionP (f = FT2 |F1 ≤ f ≤ FT1). This
probability function incorporates the information about the last intervention and - in
particular - about FT1 . To simplify the problem, we assume here that the density is
convex and defined by
ϕ(v) =
2 exp(2v)
exp(2FT1)− exp(2F1)
1{v∈[F1,FT1 ]},(17)
This density puts the most weight on the fundamental FT1 and all values that are close
to but smaller than FT1 . The smaller the intervention zone becomes, the more weight
is assigned to its largest value and thus the higher is the probability of an intervention.
Implementing the density in equation (17), the closed form expression for the exchange
rate in the lower range evolves as
s(t) = f(t) + E(A) exp(−rf(t))(18)
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where
E(A) =
∞∫
−∞
1
r
exp(rv) dϕ(v)
=
FT1∫
F1
1
r
exp(rv)
2 exp(2v)
exp(2FT1)− exp(2F1)
dv
=
2 (exp(F1(2 + r))− exp(FT1(2 + r)))
r(2 + r) (exp(2F1)− exp(2FT1))
(19)
When the exchange rate value moves beyond the upper boundary without an intervention
response, this observation serves as feedback to market participants and provides the
basis for updating prior expectations. The new information is incorporated in the same
manner as in section 2.3, i.e. technically FT1 is replaced by F∗:
s(t) = f(t) +
2 (exp(F1(2 + r))− exp(F∗(2 + r)))
r(2 + r) (exp(2F1)− exp(2F∗)) exp(−rf(t))(20)
Considering the limit case for the function in equation (20), we obtain the same results
as displayed by equation (15) and (16) for the exchange rate dynamics at the outset. The
second term in equation (20) is also growing with declining fundamental F∗. Therefore
Figure 1 also sketches the post-intervention dynamics appropriately. However, expecta-
tions play a more dominant role for this framework. The minimum of the curve is more
distant from the 45 degree line for the post-intervention model for all values except for
F1. This information unfolds when comparing the second summand in the equations
describing the exchange rate dynamics.
On the contrary, if it is the case that the central bank succeeds with the last intervention,
then the boundary ST1 appears to be a good candidate as a current off-the-record strong-
side band. This can be modelled by means of equation (6).
However, including an expectation updating process is reasonable when the current
fundamentals do not approach the implicit band for a prolonged period of time. This
might be rationalised by changing economic developments. In this situation the market
participants update by taking into account their observations after the first intervention.
After some fixed period of time t∗, the public updates its expectations if the exchange rate
has departed from the implicit strong-side band. On the contrary, if the fundamentals
have come close to this value, no updating occurs and the basic model as in section 2.2
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holds.
2.5 Information Content of Further Interventions
In the last subsection, we analyse the exchange rate dynamics assuming that an inter-
vention only occurs once. This setup may be unrealistic for economies for which (a) the
structure of the economy is constantly evolving in ways that are imperfectly understood
by both the public and policymakers and (b) the policymakers’ objective function may
change over time and is not fully known by private agents. For further interventions
we assume that market participants use a weighted average of past intervention trig-
gering exchange rates as a predictor of future interventions. Apart from simplicity, its
advantage is that the weighting may be used to specify the relevance and size of the
past interventions. Hence, we introduce a function a(t − Ti, qi) that encapsulates the
information about the time that has elapsed since intervention i and the amount of in-
volved net purchases qi, involved. Therewith we assume that a more recent intervention
plays a more important role for anchoring the expectations, i.e. ∂a∂t < 0. Likewise, an
intervention going along with higher net purchases is supposed to be of more significance
for the market participants, ∂a∂qi > 0. Consequently for the second intervention onwards,
the upper boundary of the intervention zone that is implemented directly after the Nth
intervention, N ∈ N, N ≥ 2, in time t, t ≥ TN , is calculated by means of the weighted
average of the detrended exchange rates that marked the past monetary operations.
Thus we conjecture
STN
ζ(t)
=
N∑
i=1
a(t− Ti, qi) STi
ζ(Ti)
,(21)
where the values of a are normalised in a fashion that its co-domain ranges from 0 to 1,
a(t− Ti, qi) 7→ [0, 1], and sum up to 1,
∑N
i=1 a(t− Ti, qi) = 1. The detrended exchange
rate STNζ(t) is then used to compute the upper boundary STN := ln
(
STN (t)
ζ(t)
)
. The weighted
average exchange rate value STN yields together with S1 the intervention zone for the
mechanism in section 2.4. Equation (21) implies that the anchor for expectations can
change, depending on the current and past conduct of monetary policy.
In summary, the modelling approach allows one to determine how exchange rate inter-
ventions orientate expectations towards future exchange rate dynamics.
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3 Model Calibration and Simulation
In this section, we test whether a calibrated version of the model can account quantita-
tively for Japan’s experiences. In the event study, we select interventions and interven-
tion phases and model the associated exchange rate dynamics. In the calibrations below
we focus on "positive" interventions, i.e. FX purchases or derivative operations with sim-
ilar effect. Purchases have been by far the overriding tendency of Japanese intervention,
and it is of considerable policy interest to know whether such operations could mitigate
appreciation pressures. Figure 2 shows the nominal JPY/USD exchange rate dynamics
from the year 1998 until the end of March 2011 on a day-by-day basis, where the red bars
indicate the net purchases of US dollar involved in the monetary operations by the Bank
of Japan.19 The upward facing vertical bars indicate interventions against appreciation
pressure, whereas the negative bars stand for operations against depreciation pressure.
Figure 2 shows four noteworthy characteristics. First, interventions have mainly been
aimed at attempting to depreciate the yen.20 Second, intervention dates are separated
by periods of random length. Third, repeated interventions are often carried out on
several consecutive days. In other words, interventions tended to occur in clusters.21
Fourth, one intervention regime is characterised by small-scale frequent interventions,
while another regime is characterised by large-scale rare interventions.
In the following we focus on the exchange rate dynamics from 1999 onwards, as from
that year onwards the bank’s efforts against the pressure began to strengthen – and the
US dollar was bought and the yen was sold in every instance. Furthermore, 1999 appears
to be a good starting point for applying the model in section 2.3, as the last intervention
on the strong side was undertaken 3 years previously. Hence, we may assume that the
information of the past interventions is of no significance for the expectation formation
in 1999 anymore. Below we analyse the situation at various points of time, which are
marked in Figure 2 as S′-S′v. The four highlighted dates indicate that the effects of
interventions tend not to be robust across time periods and/or modes of interventions.
S′ represents a 1-day intervention type that successfully prevented a further appreciation
19Other monetary policy instruments not discussed here (for example, interest rate changes) may also
influence the JPY/USD exchange rate, but in a less direct manner, and are normally not used with this
objective in mind.
20The sole exception is 1998 when Japan was facing contagion effects from the Asian currency crisis.
21Sequential interventions could possibly be seen as a single event as they may correspond to the
same political decision in a particular economic situation.
16
at that time. On the contrary, the appreciation pressure was not stopped by the 1-day
and record-high purchase of US dollars at S′v. A sequential strategy was pursued at
S′′, when repeated interventions were conducted over a short period of time. Simulating
the dynamics in S′′′ may clarify why no interference by the central bank was needed.
Analysing these points in time will both demonstrate the working of the model and the
implications of different intervention modes.22
S' S''
S''' S' v
Figure 2: Nominal Daily JPY/USD Exchange Rate (Blue Line) and Intervention
Amounts (Red Lines), January 1999 -March 2011
As usual, several problems related to the parameter calibration occur when applying
a theoretical framework to a real-world case. The determination of some parameters
requires the use of personal judgement or back-of-the-envelope calculations. The pa-
rameter values that have a major impact are explained in detail. To start with, we
assume σ = 0.1 and τ = 0.25. By calibrating τ , it can be determined to what extent the
expectations have a stabilising effect onto the exchange rate. For τ = 0 equation (1) and
equation (2) shrink to s = f and s = f, respectively. Thus τ = 0 typifies the dynamics
of a pure free float, where no intervention against undesired developments is expected.
The higher the value of τ is, the more the exchange rate is stabilised by the market
participants’ expectations of a band at which the central bank intervenes. Because the
choice of τ is a critical issue, we shall conduct a sensitivity analysis for alternative values
for τ .
At the beginning of our sample period the nominal exchange rate was 112.15 JPY/USD.
22Naturally, we acknowledge the problem that intervention data from other central banks are not
available. This problem is mitigated somewhat by the fact that central banks always seem to have
intervened in the same direction.
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The exchange rate at the end of the sample period was 82.87 JPY/USD. If one assumes
a continuous trend and no fluctuations, then ζ(t) is computed as ζ(t) ≈ exp(−9.845 ·
10−5 · t), where t is a time trend covering the period from 4 January 1999 to 31 March
2011. It should be noted that we choose a simple specification for the trend being the
same continuous function for the period 1999-2011 under consideration. While this is
mathematically convenient, a possible criticism to this approach is that the specification
does not allow for time-varying trend expectations. Because this could potentially in-
troduce a source of bias into the analysis, we also evaluate the sensitivity of our results
with respect to the detrending technique.
Finally, the lower boundary S1 should be distant enough from the minimum exchange
rate experienced so far. Hence, we consider a calibration of S1 = 100 JPY/USD to be
reasonable at the base point in 1999.
First we show how the modelling approach helps us to reveal the perceived dynamics
of the exchange rate on 8 January 1999, which is shortly before the intervention on 12
January in 1999 took place. This point in time is marked by S′ in Figure 2, where the
corresponding upward facing vertical line illustrates the net US dollar purchase worth
of 656.3 billion yen involved in the intervention. As no intervention on the strong side
had been undertaken for 3 years at that time, we assume that market participants did
not take into account any pre-event intervention when forming expectations. Thus, we
apply the model of section 2.3. Figure 3 shows the associated nominal exchange rate
dynamics for this benchmark case, which is reverse engineered from the detrended mod-
elling framework. Two business days before the intervention, the nominal exchange rate
S(t) was observed to be 111.53 JPY/USD, which approximately equals logarithmised
s(t) = 4.71.23 In Figure 3 this is available as the dashed red line. The perceived ex-
change rate dynamics on this day is given by the solid red line. The upper section of the
curve pastes smoothly towards the 45 degree line. Thus our simulations are in line with
the free float policy on the weak side. In contrast, the lower section of the curve pastes
smoothly at s(t) = 4.69 and therefore S(t) = 108.85. In other words, according to the
model the market participants assumed the yen to appreciate further until it reaches a
value of approximately 108.85 JPY/USD, (≈ exp(4.69)). The 3-month forward exchange
rate at that date was 110.05 JPY/USD. The 1-year JPY/USD forward exchange rate
23Please note that the values of the corresponding fundamentals evolve from the respective exchange
rate equation, i.e. equation (12) in this case.
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was 106.25. This means that the perceived maximum appreciation of the JPY/USD
exchange rate according to the model is positioned in the centre of both forward rates.24
Two days later that forecast proved almost correct as the Bank of Japan intervened two
days later at 108.88 JPY/USD. As a consequence, the exchange rate jumped to 112.1
JPY/USD.
s(t)
f(t)
Figure 3: Perceived Pre-Intervention Exchange Rate Dynamics for 8 January 1999
Being based on the post-intervention modelling framework of section 2.4, Figures 4
and 5 display the calibrated signalling effect of this intervention. As stated above, the
calibrations depend upon the parameterisation of τ . To investigate the robustness of
our results to alternative τ measures, we evaluate the perceived exchange rate dynamics
for τ = 0.25 and τ = 0.50. The upper boundary of the intervention zone [S1, S2] is now
assumed to be in conformity with the exchange rate that has triggered the intervention.
This exchange rate is again marked by the red dashed line. Both figures show that after
the intervention, a further small appreciation beyond 108.88 JPY/USD was expected.
The signalling effect of the last intervention is revealed by the size of the lens that forms
between the dashed red line and the minimum of the solid red curve. The smaller lens in
Figure 4 compared to Figure 3 reveals that the next intervention was expected to take
place in the immediate vicinity of the previous intervention point. Another indication
of the stabilising effect of the intervention is the counter-clockwise rotation of the red
curve away from the blue curve in the lower curve segment. Put differently, the perceived
exchange rate dynamics at the strong side is stabilised, as the market participants recall
the past intervention and incorporate it into their expectations. As expected, this effect
24Alternatively, one may derive the market’s perception of the implicit target zone from forward-
looking options. This literature is now very large. See Söderlind and Svensson (1997) for an introductory
text.
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is slightly more pronounced for τ = 0.50.25
Figure 4: Perceived Post-Intervention Exchange Rate Dynamics for 12 January 1999
with τ = 0.25
Figure 5: Perceived Post-Intervention Exchange Rate Dynamics for 12 January 1999
with τ = 0.5
Another question that can be raised is whether the intervention volumes matter. As
an extension, we therefore further refine our analysis to see whether the magnitude of
an intervention operation affects its outcome. To this end, the model in section 2.4
along with section 2.5 is applied to the situation on 9 March 2000 - being the point
S′′ in Figure 2. One possibility is that higher volumes and/or cumulative interventions
convey a stronger or more credible signal, than small volumes and/or 1-day interventions.
Section 2.5 explains how the upper boundary in the wake of past interventions is derived.
In order to account for different modes of Bank of Japan interventions while at the same
time economising on the number of parameters in the model, we specify three different
functions for a: a1, a2 and a3. All three versions of the model have one thing in common:
25This result is mirrored by the marginal appreciation of the 3-month and 1-year JPY/USD forward
exchange rate immediately after the intervention to 110.71 and 106.84, respectively.
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different ways of implementing interventions may yield different information.
First, we assume that a depends upon the normalised volume and the no-intervention
business days until 9 March 2000:
a1(t− Ti, qi) =
qi
t−Ti
N∑
j=1
qj
t−Tj
.(22)
In other words, the specification of a1 allows the intensity with which the Bank of Japan
defends their exchange rate target to play a role for the effectiveness of interventions.
Second, we assume a weighting function in which the intervention intensity does not
play a role. Instead, only the time that has elapsed since the last intervention matters
according to
a2(t− Ti) =
1
t−Ti
N∑
j=1
1
t−Tj
.(23)
Third, the number of consecutive interventions alongside their frequencies is used as
an indicator of the intensity of Bank of Japan interventions. With every consecutive
intervention, market participants take the intentions of the central bank more seriously.
If interventions are being conducted in quick succession, they gain more weight.
a3(t− Ti) =
exp(i)
Ti−Ti−1
N∑
j=1
exp(j)
Tj−Tj−1
(24)
Thereby we assume that T1 − T0 := T2 − T1. The simulations may clarify whether
the mere presence of the Bank of Japan matters more or less than the strength of the
signal.26 Table 1 describes the components for the computation of a1, a2 and a3. The
first column gives the date of the past intervention, the second the nominal exchange
rate, the third the number of business days until the simulated day in time t, the fourth
the amount of net purchases of US dollar in billions of yen, and finally the last three
columns comprise the weighing coefficient computed with equation (22), (23) and (24),
respectively. With the coefficients computed by a1, equation (21) yields the detrended
26In the standard microstructure mechanism, only price signals matter (see, for example, Glosten and
Milgrom (1985)). Easley and O’Hara (1987) have subsequently introduced volume signals helping to
improve the learning process.
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exchange rate STNζ(t) of approximately 110.65 JPY/USD and the nominal exchange rate of
107.45 JPY/USD. The upper boundary of the intervention zone is thus assumed to be
4.68 in the simulation. The other weighting procedure gives the detrended exchange rate
of approximately 110.18 JPY/USD, which equals 107.01 JPY/USD in nominal terms.
Hence, we obtain an upper boundary of 4.67.
Date (Ti) STi t− Ti Net Purchase qi Value of a1 Value of a2 Value of a3
(in Bn yen)
1999/01/12 112,1 292 656,3 0,010295392 0,003046727 1,22465 × 10−7
1999/06/10 118,81 187 166,5 0,004078458 0,004757457 3,32895 × 10−7
1999/06/14 120,35 185 1405,9 0,034810163 0,004808889 4,75073 × 10−5
1999/06/21 122,3 180 927,2 0,023595233 0,004942469 5,16553 × 10−5
1999/07/05 122,38 171 783,7 0,020993125 0,005202599 7,80076 × 10−5
1999/07/20 118,93 160 179,2 0,005130284 0,005560278 0,000173493
1999/07/21 118,28 159 405,2 0,011673354 0,005595248 0,005187623
1999/09/10 109 124 640,1 0,023645554 0,007174552 0,000402898
1999/09/14 105,34 122 379,4 0,014244947 0,007292167 0,019165819
1999/11/29 102,42 70 724,4 0,047402774 0,012709206 0,002003773
1999/11/30 101,78 69 410,4 0,027244674 0,012893397 0,28323462
1999/12/24 102,96 51 370,4 0,033267806 0,017444008 0,042772862
2000/01/04 103,05 47 575,3 0,05606862 0,018928604 0,523209125
2000/03/08 106,88 1 150,1 0,687549617 0,8896444 0,123672161
Table 1: Computation of the Weighting Coefficients a1, a2 and a3 in (22), (23) and (24).
The intervention campaign version of the model in equation (24) is straightforward to
implement. The upper boundary of the intervention zone is computed to be 102.84 and
hence 4.63. The calibration results for the three model variants are given in Figure 6-8.
The alternative sets of model runs allows one to analyse interventions from different
angles.
Figure 6: Calibrated Exchange Rate Dynamics for 9 March 2000 on the Assumption
that the Elapsed Time and the Volume Information Played a Role
Next we discuss what difference all this makes. The comparison of Figure 6 with Figure
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7 indicates that incorporating the intervention amounts means that the expectations
are anchored to a slightly higher exchange rate. In other words: A larger interven-
tion amount improves the quality of the signal and therefore it may be concluded that
larger-scale operations should be favoured by the Bank of Japan.27 The calibrated ex-
change rate dynamics for a3 in Figure 8 reveals that intervention campaigns exert a
virtuous impact on the dynamics of the exchange rate. To the extent that influencing
the JPY/USD exchange rate is by far the most important objective of the Japanese
authorities, it might be concluded that repeated operations should be favoured by the
Bank of Japan. In short, allowing for heterogeneous intervention patterns sharpens our
understanding of the effects of interventions.
Figure 7: Calibrated Exchange Rate Dynamics for 9 March 2000 on the Assumption
that Solely the Elapsed Time Since the Last Intervention Played a Role
Figure 8: Calibrated Exchange Rate Dynamics for 9 March 2000 on the Assumption
that Intervention Campaigns Matter
On the surface, one may simply think that a criterion for evaluating the success of an
intervention means to check the direction of the exchange rate: if the yen depreciates
27This is an important result since part of the literature argues that the incidence of central bank
intervention matters, but not the size of the intervention as such.
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as a result of the intervention, then it is a success, and vice versa. However, this is
ultimately too simplistic. Even if an intervention does not reverse the trend, the policy
may not be a failure as the simplistic assessment supposes. When the appreciation
trend is strong, the yen would have appreciated had there not been an intervention.
Appreciation by the magnitude less than otherwise (counterfactual) may be hailed as a
success by the central bank. The obvious problem is the counterfactual. Where would
the exchange rate have been if there had not been an intervention? In other words,
the counterfactuals should provide genuine answers to "what if...?" questions. When we
consider whether to implement a new exchange rate policy or try to evaluate whether an
intervention has been successful, we consider the counterfactual question: "What if the
FX intervention had not been undertaken?".28 We start from the assumption that the
sole difference in both scenarios is that the intervention cluster has either occurred of
has never taken place. All else being equal, how does the exposure to past interventions
in turn determine the perceived exchange rate dynamics? With the proviso of these
underlying difficulties, we calibrate in Figure 9 the exchange rate dynamics for S′′ on
the (counterfactual) assumption that the repeated interventions prior to S′′ have not
been carried out. So what has happened at S′′?
s(t)
f(t)
Figure 9: Counterfactual Simulation on the Assumption that the Repeated Interventions
Prior to S” have not Been Carried Out
There are some notable findings here. The perceived boundary of the intervention zone
is now represented by S(t) = 109.61 and therefore s(t) = 4.67. The comparison with
28"What if...?"’ questions play a central role throughout economics. Of course, our degree of certainty
about our counterfactual judgments can be no higher than our degree of certainty that our modelling
framework is correct. Furthermore, when the counterfactual posed is too far from the data at hand,
conclusions drawn from the analyses become based largely on speculation that few would be willing to
defend.
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the baseline calibration results reveals that the occurrence of interventions does affect
the perceived exchange rate dynamics to a noteworthy extent. Ultimately, this implies
that market participants have altered their exchange rate expectations.
Next, we apply the model in section 2.3 to the ’eventless’ time from 2006-2010. Since
the last intervention took place on the 16 March 2004, we may safely assume that past
interventions did not play a role anymore at that time. This in fact means that the model
variant of section 2.3 can be applied. On 12 December 2008 the JPY/USD exchange
rate was S(t) = 91.29 or s ≈ 4.51 in logarithmic terms (dashed red line). This point is
marked by S′′′ in Figure 2. Given the elapsed time and the assumed gradual appreciation
of the JPY/USD exchange rate over time, the expected intervention trigger-point has
shifted down. According to the model framework, market participants expected at that
date no intervention for S(t) > 88.23 or s(t) > 4.48. Since the exchange rate still hovered
above this threshold, no further intervention was expected. This is in accord with the
absence of an intervention at that date in Figure 10.
Figure 10: Perceived Exchange Rate Dynamics for 12 December 2008
The perceived dynamics of the exchange rate around the 1-day intervention at S′v is
displayed in Figure 11 and 12, respectively. More precisely, we investigate the exchange
rate dynamics shortly before and after the intervention on 15 September 2010, where the
Bank of Japan vigorously attempted to prevent a further appreciation of the JPY/USD
exchange rate.
The single vertical red bar represents the net US dollar purchase worth of 2124.9 billion
yen, which corresponds to the highest amount of US dollar ever bought in an intervention
during the period under consideration. On 13 September 2010 the JPY/USD exchange
rate was S(t) = 83.5 which corresponds to s(t) = 4.42 (dashed red line). According
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Figure 11: Perceived Pre-Intervention Exchange Rate Dynamics for 13 September 2010
Figure 12: Perceived Post-Intervention Dynamics for 15 September 2010
to the model calibration in Figure 11, a further appreciation to a value of s(t) = 4.4
corresponding to S(t) = 81.44 was expected at that time. The 1-year JPY/USD forward
rate of 83.22 on 13 September also indicated a further appreciation. In view of this, the
Bank of Japan undertook a huge 1-day intervention to prevent the yen from appreciating
further. The impact of the intervention upon the perceived exchange rate dynamics is
displayed in Figure 12. Clearly, both curves look almost alike. Thus, despite the strong
signal, market participants have abstained from adjusting their beliefs. This points to
policy ineffectiveness. In other words, S′v is an example that a large intervention amount
is not necessarily a guarantee of success. We attribute this finding to the firmness of
agents’ beliefs.
Last but not least, we investigate the robustness of our calibration results with respect to
an alternative detrending technique. To inform the selection of an alternative detrending
method, we draw on the PPP literature. Instead of using a mechanically determined
linear trend we detrend the JPY/USD exchange rate using the Japan-US CPI inflation
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differential. The replicated calibration results under the assumption of a PPP detrended
exchange rate are given in Figure 13. Comparing the results in Figure 13 with those in
Figure 10-12 reveals that the choice of the detrending technique has very modest effects
and thus our results are surprisingly robust.
s(t)
(a) 12 December 2008
s(t)
(b) 13 September 2010
(c) 15 September 2010
Figure 13: Calibrated Exchange Rate Dynamics Under the Assumption of a PPP De-
trended Exchange Rate
What do all these results suggest? All in all, it appears that there are different ways and
detours in which signals can be transmitted. The signal can forcefully influence market
expectations as in the Figure 4 and 5, where a relative small intervention amount sufficed
to stop the appreciating trend. This holds also true for multiple interventions as shown
by Figure 6 and 7. In contrast, huge 1-day interventions such as those in Figure 12
may also prove ineffective as measured by the subsequent further appreciation of the
JYP/USD exchange rate.
4 Conclusions
Exchange market developments and their associated economic effects constitute a defin-
ing challenge of our time. Although exchange rate interventions seemingly went out of
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fashion with the advent of inflation targeting, the recent financial crisis has put them
firmly back on the centre stage. Massive interventions have been employed by emerg-
ing market countries to dampen currency appreciation. Not least for that reason, the
effectiveness of Japanese FX interventions has given rise to an important debate. The
situation is further aggravated by the lack of an official stance on the determinants of
intervention. This has been a major impetus for researchers to uncover the effects of
time-varying interventions upon the exchange rate dynamics.29 Our "learning by in-
tervention" model examines the mechanism through which central bank intervention
signals are transmitted to market participants and ultimately impact the exchange rate
dynamics. Using an asymmetric and implicit target zone framework with learning, we
model the time-varying impact of interventions upon mean JPY/USD exchange rate
expectations during the period 1999 -2011.30 The model calibrations at various points
in time clarify the workings of the model and illustrate how Japanese exchange rate
interventions have shaped expectations towards future exchange rate dynamics. All in
all, then, this provides an important layer of understanding in relation to exchange mar-
ket developments. It is important to emphasise that the possibility described above,
namely that interventions shape exchange rate expectations, is just that: a possibility.
We choose to emphasise it because a general perception is that policy signalling is the
most effective transmission channel of FX interventions.31 In this sense, the modelling
framework adds significantly to the literature on hybrid exchange rate regimes and rep-
resents a fruitful avenue for future research into the modelling of undisclosed exchange
rate corridors.
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